CORPORATIONS-DIRECTORS

WHO APPROVE SALE OF CORPO-

RATION WITHOUT SUFFICIENT DELIBERATION NOT ENTITLED
TO PROTECTION AFFORDED By BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE-

Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
Traditionally, the business judgment rule has afforded corporate directors considerable protection in making business decisions. ' Courts have generally taken a highly deferential approach
in their analysis of decisions made by a corporate board of directors whenever the business judgment rule is raised as a defense.2
Recently, however, there has been a growing trend for the judiciary to take a more active role in reviewing the business decisions
of corporate boards.3 Indicative of this movement is the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.4 In Van
Gorkom, the court denied the directors the protection of the business judgment rule and held that they acted in a "grossly negligent" manner by approving the sale of the corporation after only
two hours of consideration. 5
Trans Union Corporation (Trans Union) was a publicly
traded holding company 6 incorporated under the laws of Delaware.7 Despite Trans Union's annual cash flow' of several hunI This note focuses primarily on the Delaware courts' treatment of the business
judgment rule.
2 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Getty Oil Co. v.
Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148,
221 A.2d 487 (Del. 1966); Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del.
1964); Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342 (Del. Ch. July 6, 1982), rev'd sub nom. Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310
A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 1973); Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62 (Del. Ch. 1969), aFd, 266
A.2d 878 (Del. 1970); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148
(1943); Karasik v. Pacific E. Corp., 21 Del. Ch. 81, 180 A. 604 (1935); Mitchell v.
Highland-Western Glass Co., 19 Del. Ch. 326, 167 A. 831 (1933); Cole v. National
Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil
Ref. Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 193, 126 A. 46 (1924).
3 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); see also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (disinterested investment company directors must serve as "independent check" on
management); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S. 2d
920 (1979) (court may examine disinterested independence of special litigation
committee of board of directors).
4 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
5 Id. at 884, 888.
6 A holding company is defined as "[a] company that confines its activities to
owning stock in,and supervising management of, other companies." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 658 (5th ed. 1979).
7 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
S Cash flow is "[t]he cash generated from the property. It is different than net
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dred million dollars, it was unable to generate "sufficient taxable
income to offset increasingly large investment tax credits
(ITCs)." 9 Consequently, on August 27, 1980, Trans Union's
chairman and chief executive officer, Jerome W. Van Gorkom,
met with Trans Union's senior management' 0 in an effort to find
a permanent solution to the tax credit problem."' Among the alternatives considered was a leveraged buy out 12 by management. '13 Fearing a possible conflict of interest for the members of
management, however, Van Gorkom subsequently vetoed the
idea of a leveraged buy out. 4
In early September, Van Gorkom approached Jay A.
Pritzker, a corporate takeover specialist, with an offer to sell
Trans Union to Pritzker's company, Marmon Group, Inc.
(Marmon). 5 Van Gorkom arrived at a price of $55 per share for
the company based solely upon figures used by Trans Union's
controller to assess the feasibility of a leveraged buy out.1 6 During the week beginning September 15, 1980, Pritzker and Van
Gorkom entered into further negotiations concerning the proposed sale of Trans Union to Marmon. 7 These discussions concluded with Pritzker's offer to purchase Trans Union on
income; cash flow looks to the amount of cash left after all payments are made,
whether they are tax deductible or not. Cash receipts minus disbursements. . .for
a given period." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 196 (5th ed. 1979).
9 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
10 Trans Union's senior management included the following people: Donald
Romans, the corporation's chief financial officer; Carl Peterson, the controller;
Bruce S. Chelberg, the president and chief operating officer; William Browder, the
vice president; and William Moore, the corporate general counsel. Id. at 865-67.
I1 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865. The problem arose from the fact that Trans
Union's rail car leasing division was taking large accelerated depreciation deductions on its assets, thus decreasing the available taxable income. Id. at 864. Without sufficient taxable income, the ITCs would go unused. See id.
12 A leveraged buy out is defined as
[t]he purchase of assets or stocks of a privately owned company or a
public company or a subsidiary of these companies, in which the purchaser uses a significant amount of debt and very little equity capital.
This is accomplished by utilizing the purchased assets for collateral and
the acquired earnings stream to amortize the debt.
J. BERENYI, THE MODERN AMERICAN BUSINESS DICTIONARY 158 (1982).
1'3 Van Gorkon, 488 A.2d at 865. Until this time, Trans Union had relied upon a
program of acquiring small companies in order to increase available taxable income
and thus offset available ITCs. Id. Van Gorkom, however, did not consider this a
permanent solution to the problem. Id.
14 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865.
15 Id. at 866-67. Marmon was owned by Pritzker and his brother. See id. at 864.
16 Id. at 866.
17 See id. at 867.
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September 18th at $55 per share.' 8 The terms of that offer included a demand by Pritzker that he receive an option to
purchase 1,000,000 shares of newly issued Trans Union stock at
market price.' 9 In addition, the offer was made contingent upon
Trans Union's board of directors acting within three days.2 0
Two days later, on September 20th, Van Gorkom disclosed
the terms of the merger to the members of Trans Union's senior
management, but he failed to furnish them with a copy of the
agreement. 2 1 The majority of the members of senior management objected to the merger proposal. 22 Despite senior management's reaction, Van Gorkom presented the proposal to the
board of directors,2 3 urging them to let the shareholders make
the ultimate determination as to the fairness of Pritzker's offer.2 4
18 See id.

19 Id. at 866-67. Pritzker would be free to sell those shares to a higher bidder. Id.
at 866.
20 Id. at 867.
21 Id. At this meeting, Donald Romans, Trans Union's chief financial officer, disclosed that his department had conducted a second study on the price needed for a
successful leveraged buyout. Id. This study revealed that the price of Trans Union
stock ranged from $55 to $65 per share. Id. This report, however, was not made
available to the members of management present at the meeting. Id.
22 Id. Romans objected, arguing that the proposal essentially "amounted to 'an
agreed merger as opposed to an offer.' "Id. at 868. Romans's argument was based
on the fact that "the agreement to sell Pritzker one million newly-issued shares at
market price would inhibit other offers, as would the prohibitions against soliciting
bids and furnishing inside information to other bidders." Id. at 867-68. The only
two members of senior management who supported the proposal were Bruce S.
Chelberg and Carl Peterson. Id. at 867.
23 Id. at 868. All but one of the members of the board were present at the meeting. Id. Director O'Boyle was absent due to illness. Id. The board of directors
consisted of five "inside" directors and five "outside" directors. Id. Generally, all
members of the board were well-educated and had a vast amount of business experience. Id. The "inside" directors were defendants Bonser, O'Boyle, Browder,
Chelberg, and Van Gorkom. Id. At the time of the proposed merger, these members had been collectively employed by Trans Union for 116 years and had served
on the Trans Union board for a combined total of 68 years. Id. at 894 (McNeilly,J.,
dissenting). The "outside" directors included defendants Wallis, Johnson, Lanterman, Morgan, and Reneker. Id. at 868. Dr. Wallis was "a professor of economics at
Yale University, dean of the graduate school of business at the University of Chicago, and Chancellor of the University of Rochester." Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). He had served as a member of Trans Union's board since 1962, as well as
serving on a number of other major corporate boards. Id. The other four "outside"
directors were all chief executive officers of major corporations. Id.
24 Id. at 868. The court summarized Van Gorkom's presentation of the terms of
the merger as follows:
Pritzker would pay $55 in cash for all outstanding shares of Trans Union
stock upon completion of which Trans Union would be merged into
New T Company, a subsidiary wholly-owned by Pritzker and formed to
implement the merger; for a period of 90 days, Trans Union could re-
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Van Gorkom also asked Donald Romans, Trans Union's chief financial officer, to disclose the results of a study conducted by
Trans Union's financial department in connection with the possibility of a leveraged buy OUt. 2 5 Romans emphasized the fact that
the study was merely a step in the direction of determining the
value of Trans Union and was in no way meant to be viewed as a
valuation study.2 6 Trans Union's president, Bruce S. Chelberg,
concluded the meeting by advising the other board members that
he supported Van Gorkom's representations as well as the
27
merger itself.
After two hours of discussion, the directors voted to approve
the proposed merger agreement.2 8 That evening, Van Gorkom
and Pritzker executed the agreement at a social function. 29 The
following Monday, September 22nd, Trans Union issued a press
release announcing the merger.3 0 In response to this announcement, many key members of Trans Union's management
ceive, but could not actively solicit, competing offers; the offer had to be
acted on by the next evening, Sunday, September 21; Trans Union
could only furnish to competing bidders published information, and not
proprietary information; the offer was subject to Pritzker obtaining the
necessary financing by October 10, 1980; if the financing contingency
were met or waived by Pritzker, Trans Union was required to sell to
Pritzker one million newly-issued shares of Trans Union at $38 per
share.
Id.

25 Id. at 869. The study was made for the purpose of determining the minimum
price per share that would justify a leveraged buy out by management. Id.
26 Id. Romans's statement as to the nature of this study was consistent with his
initial objection to the proposed merger. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869. Chelberg, Trans Union's president, "testified
that he 'participated to make sure that the Board members collectively were clear
on the details of the agreement or offer from Pritzker.' " Id.
28 Id. The board later claimed to have made its acceptance conditional upon
Trans Union's right to "share its proprietary information with any other potential
bidders" and accept any better offer made during the 90 day market test period. Id.
Although these two conditions were disputed at trial, it was uncontroverted that the
board failed to reserve the right to pursue other offers. Id.
29 Id. Neither Van Gorkom nor any other board member read the agreement
prior to its execution. Id.
30 Id. The press release stated that Trans Union had entered into a definitive
agreement to merge with Pritzker's corporation at an agreed upon price of $55 per
share. Id. at 881. The press release also stated that the merger was subject to
stockholder approval at a special meeting and that Pritzker reserved the right to
revoke the offer if he could not obtain proper financing for the merger. Id. at 88182. In additon, the press release announced a related transaction in which Pritzker
was given the option to purchase 1,000,000 newly-issued shares of Trans Union
stock at just above market price. Id. Finally, the release stated that completion of
the transaction was subject to the preparation and distribution of a definitive proxy
statement and any necessary governmental approval. Id.
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threatened to resign.3 ' In an attempt to placate those members,
Pritzker offered to modify the agreement in return for their
promise to remain with the company for at least six months after
the merger. 2 The primary modifications were as follows: (1) the
agreement would be amended to permit Trans Union to solicit
competing offers through January, 1981, and (2) the shareholders' meeting would take place on February 10, 1981 instead of in
early January. 3 The purpose of the first amendment was to allow
for a three-month "market test" period to ascertain the fairness
of Pritzker's offer.34 Pacified by these proposals, the directors
voted on October 8th to approve the amendments even though
they would not be drafted until two days later. 5
On October 9th, Pritzker moved to limit the proposed market test by informing Trans Union that he had completed the
necessary financing arrangements.36 This action, he alleged,
bound both parties to a firm purchase and sale agreement. In
addition, Pritzker publicly announced the exercise of his option
to purchase 1,000,000 shares of Trans Union at just above the
going market price. 8 A second press release was issued shortly
thereafter, announcing that Pritzker had obtained the financing
necessary to consummate the merger and that he had purchased
the 1,000,000 shares of Trans Union stock. 39 This press release

also stated that Trans Union was now permitted to solicit other
merger offers.4 ° If a more favorable offer were not received by
February 10, 1981, Pritzker's proposed merger would then be
submitted for shareholder approval. 4
Van Gorkom received the amendments to the agreement on
October 10th.42 Although the amendments were at variance with
his understanding of their terms, Van Gorkom signed the documents on behalf of the board.43 The other members of the board
31
32

Id. at 869.
Id.

33 Id.
34 See id.
35 Id. at 882-83.

Id. at 883.
Id.
Id.
39 Id. at 870, 883.
40 Id. at 870.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See id. at 883. Van Gorkom believed that the amendments gave Trans Union
an unqualified right to solicit other offers as well as an absolute right to withdraw
from the Pritzker merger. See id. at 882-83. In actuality, the October 10th amend36
37
38
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did not formally approve the amendments, however, until almost
two months later.44
In the three months that followed, Trans Union was offered
for sale in the open market for the purpose of assessing the adequacy of Pritzker's offer. 45 The only firm offer Trans Union received was from the investment firm of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts
& Co. (KKR). 46 The transaction with KKR was never completed,
however, primarily because Trans Union's rail car leasing operation, a member of the group KKR was supposed to purchase,
withdrew from the agreement. 47 Consequently, Van Gorkom

deemed it unnecessary to disclose the existence of the KKR proposal at the board meeting scheduled later that day. 48 General
Electric Credit Corporation (GE) also expressed interest in
purchasing Trans Union at a higher offering price than that tendered by Pritzker, but GE terminated its advances when Pritzker
refused to extend the February 10, 1981 deadline for
negotiations. 49
On January 21st, management sent out its proxy statements
for the February 10th shareholders' meeting. 0 The board met
again on January 26th and voted to approve the Pritzker
ments severely limited Trans Union's right to solicit other offers and to withdraw
from the Pritzker merger. See id. at 870, 883. The court noted:
Under the October 10 amendments, a better offer was no longer sufficient to permit Trans Union's withdrawal. Trans Union was now permitted to terminate the Pritzker Agreement and abandon the merger
only if, prior to February 10, 1981, Trans Union had either consummated a merger (or sale of assets) with a third party or had entered into
a "definitive" merger agreement more favorable than Pritzker's and for
a greater consideration-subject only to stockholder approval.
Id. at 883.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 870. The idea underlying the market test was that it would establish the
adequacy of Pritzker's offer through a comparison with other offers. See id.
46 Id. at 884. KKR made its offer in early December. Id.
47 Id. at 885. Throughout the negotiations with KKR, Van Gorkom expressed
his disapproval of their offer. Id. at 884-85. Because of conditions contained in
KKR's offer, Van Gorkom did not view the offer as firm. Id. Claiming it would chill
other offers, he refused to publicize KKR's proposal. Id. at 885. Interestingly, the
court observed that Van Gorkom's unwillingness to publicize the KKR transaction
was "inconsistent" with his previous "espousal of the September 22 press release
following Trans Union's acceptance of Pritzker's proposal." Id. at 885 n.27.
Although Van Gorkom denied responsibility for the withdrawal of the railroad leasing operation, he spoke with the chief officer of that operation prior to KKR's decision to revoke its offer. Id. at 885.
48

Id.

49

Id.

5o

Id. at 870.
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merger.5 ' The board also voted to mail out a supplement to the
original proxy statements, which purportedly set forth all previously undisclosed information concerning the merger.5 2 Finally,
on February 10th, an overwhelming majority of Trans Union's
stockholders voted to approve the Pritzker merger.53
Prior to the shareholders' approval of the transaction, Alden
Smith, a shareholder of Trans Union, petitioned to enjoin the
merger.5" On February 3, 1981, the trial court denied Smith's
motion for a preliminary injunction. 55 Thereafter, Smith was
joined by John W. Gosselin, and the two instituted a class action
on behalf of the shareholders of Trans Union, seeking a rescission of the merger or, in the alternative, damages from the board
of directors of Trans Union. 56 In an unreported opinion, the Delaware Court of Chancery held for the board.5 7 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Delaware reversed and held that by approving
the sale of Trans Union, the directors had acted in an uninformed manner and were not entitled to the protection of the
business judgment rule.5
The origin of the business judgment rule can be traced to
the early nineteenth century. 59 The rule developed at common
law based on a belief that people of intellect and prudence would
not serve as corporate directors if they were potentially liable for

52

Id.
Id.

53

Id.

51

Id. at 864 n.l, 870.
Id. at 864 n.l.
Id. at 863, 864 n.1.
57 See Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, slip op. at 15 (Del. Ch.July 6, 1982), rev'd sub
nom. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
58 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864, 888.
59 One of the earliest American statements of the business judgment rule can be
found in an 1829 Louisiana Supreme Court case, Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.)
68 (La. 1829). That case involved a suit brought by the shareholders of a bank
against the bank's directors, seeking to hold the directors liable for losses resulting
from defalcations by the bank's president and cashier. Id. at 68. In reaching the
conclusion that the directors should not be held liable for mere good faith errors in
judgment, the court stated:
The test of responsibility therefore should be, not the certainty of wisdom in others, but the possession of ordinary knowledge; and by shewing [sic] that the error of the agent is of so gross a kind, that a man of
common sense, and ordinary attention, would not have fallen into it.
The rule which fixes responsibility, because men of unerring sagacity
are supposed to exist, and would have been found by the principal, appears to us essentially erroneous.
Id. at 78.
54

55
56
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mere errors in judgment. 60 One of the earliest Delaware cases to
espouse the principles upon which the business judgment
rule is
61
predicated was Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refining Corp.
In Robinson, the directors of the Pittsburgh Oil Refining Corporation offered for sale all of the corporation's assets.6" The directors received a number of bids, two of which they ultimately
considered.63 Although the two bids differed by almost $20,000,
the directors of Pittsburgh Oil accepted the lower bid.' The
plaintiff, a minority shareholder, instituted suit against the corporate directors, seeking a preliminary injunction to restrain the
sale of the corporate assets. 6 5 The plaintiff alleged that acceptance of the lower bid constituted a total disregard of the corporation's best interests.6 6
In denying the preliminary injunction, the court articulated
the founding principles of what would later become known as the
business judgment rule.6 7 At the outset, the court recognized
that "the first essential requirement" for a transaction of this nature is shareholder consent. 68 It noted that since there was no
evidence to suggest the shareholders had acted in bad faith, it
60 See Arsht, The BusinessJudgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 97 (1979);
see also Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191, 199 (1847) (prudent man would not
accept directorship if liable for errors in judgment); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart.
(n.s.) 68, 78 (La. 1829) (no person would serve as corporate director if required to
exercise perfect wisdom).
61 14 Del. Ch. 193, 126 A. 46 (1924).
62 Id. at 195, 126 A. at 46.
63 See id. at 195-96, 126 A. at 47.
64 Id. at 197, 126 A. at 47. The first bid was made by the Hood Trading Company and amounted to $487,946.67. Id. at 196, 126 A. at 47. This would have
resulted in a distribution dividend upon dissolution of $4.706 per share. Id. The
second bid was submitted by Poe & Davies and one of their associates, Joseph Kennedy. Id. This bid was for $466,650, which worked out to a distribution dividend
upon dissolution of $4.50 per share. Id. In addition, the two bids differed in another respect. See id. at 195-96, 126 A. at 47. Hood was to pay $274,235 in cash for
a portion of Pittsburgh Oil's assets. Id. at 195, 126 A. at 47. Other assets having a
net value of$213,711.67 were to be retained by the corporation. Id. at 195-96, 126
A. at 47. Pittsburgh Oil would also retain all of its liabilities. Id. at 195, 126 A. at
47. On the other hand, Poe & Davies offered to pay $466,650 in cash for all of the
assets of Pittsburgh Oil subject to all liabilities. Id. at 196, 126 A. at 47. Finally, the
two bids contained different plans for the capital structure of the new corporation
that was to take control of the assets purchased. Id. at 195-96, 126 A. at 47.
65 Id. at 197, 126 A. at 47.
66 Id. The plaintiffs claim was based upon § 64a of Delaware's General Corporation Law, which provided that corporate directors have a duty, when selling all of a
corporation's assets, to act expediently and in the best interests of the corporation.
See id.
67 See id. at 199, 126 A. at 48.
68 Id.
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was proper to infer that the directors had likewise acted without
bad faith.6'9 The court reasoned, therefore, that the law presumes
that directors act with a bona fide regard for the best interests of
the corporation.70
The court then observed that the preliminary injunction
would not issue if the terms and conditions of the sale itself did
not indicate that the bargain was so unfair as to constitute
fraud. 7' After thoroughly analyzing the terms of the sale in light
of this presumption, 72 the court concluded that the directors' acceptance of the lower bid was not so unreasonable as to be removed from "the exercise of honest and sound business
judgment.
4

' 7'

Accordingly,

the

preliminary

injunction

was

denied.
In Cole v. National Cash Credit Association,7 5 the Delaware Court
of Chancery applied a similar analysis in upholding the directors'
decision to proceed with a stock-for-stock merger.76 Cole involved
a minority shareholder's action, which sought to enjoin the proposed merger.77 The basis of the complaint was that the value of
the shareholders' preferred stock exceeded the value of the stock
69 Id. The court characterized the defendant directors as the shareholders'
"friendly representatives on the board." Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 199-200, 126 A. at 48.
72 See id. at 200-04, 126 A. at 48-50.
73 Id. at 202, 126 A. at 49. The court reasoned that although there was a difference of approximately $21,000 on the face of the two bids, this was not the only
difference between the two bids. See id. at 200-01, 126 A. at 49. In addition, the
court noted that there existed other terms that effectively lowered the difference
between the two bids to only about $5000. Id. at 201, 126 A. at 49; see supra note
58. The court observed that if the only difference between the two bids consisted
of the $21,000 face disparity, acceptance of the lower bid would clearly have constituted fraud. Id. at 200, 126 A. at 49.
74 Id. at 205, 126 A. at 51; cf. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of
Am., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (1923). Allied Chemical was factually similar to Robinson except for two principal features. Robinson, 14 Del. Ch. at 197, 126 A. at 47.
First, in Allied Chemical there was majority control of the stock, which did not exist in
Robinson. Id. Second, Allied Chemical involved personal interest on the part of the
directors. Id. Because of this personal interest, the Allied Chemical court refused to
afford the directors the protection of the presumption that they acted in good faith.
See Allied Chemical, 14 Del. Ch. at 24, 120 A. at 496. Therefore, the court granted
the preliminary injunction. Id. at 25, 120 A. at 497.
75 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931).
76 See id. at 64, 156 A. at 190. National Cash Credit Association, the defendant,
was to merge into the Franklin Plan Corporation, the surviving company. Id. at 49,
156 A. at 184.
77 Id. Actually, Cole involved two separate actions, each seeking to enjoin the
proposed merger. Id. The other action was brought by the Journal Square Bank
Building Company, a creditor of the defendant. Id. at 50, 156 A. at 185.
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offered in exchange by the surviving corporation."8 The plaintiffs
asserted that this constituted a fraud against the shareholders.7"
In its opinion, the court first noted that the complaint was
framed in terms of constructive fraud, rather than actual fraud. 8 °
The court stated that because a board's decision to accept a particular price is discretionary, a claim of fraud will not be justified
by a trivial difference in the value of the stock exchanged. 8
Rather, the court opined that the disparity in value must be so
great that the board's acceptance of the exchange constituted a
conscious abuse of discretion.8 2 The Cole court reasoned that absent a showing of such abuse of discretion, the board's decision
was presumed to have been made in good faith.8" Concluding
that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption
that the directors acted in good faith, the court rejected the
plaintiff's petition for a preliminary injunction.8 4
While Cole and Robinson focused upon the presence or absence of good faith on the part of corporate directors,8 5 these
courts failed to address the affirmative duties of a director under
the business judgment rule. In Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass
Co.,86 a Delaware chancery court first recognized that the business judgment rule invests directors with certain affirmative duties incident to their status.8 7
Mitchell involved a derivative suit by minority shareholders
seeking to enjoin a proposed sale of all the assets of the defendant corporation.8 8 One of the plaintiffs' principal contentions was
Id. at 49, 156 A. at 184.
Id. at 56, 156 A. at 187. The stock valuation problem was based on an alleged
prejudicial undervaluation of the assets of the National Cash Credit Association
and an overvaluation of those of the Franklin Plan Corporation. Id. at 56-57, 156
A. at 187.
80 Id., 156 A. at 187.
81 Id. at 58, 156 A. at 188.
82 See id. The court observed that this is necessarily so because "otherwise [the
judicial system] would be choked with applications of recalcitrant stockholders."
Id. (quoting Donald v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 61 N.J. Eq. 458, 463, 48 A.
786, 788 (Ch.), rev'd on other grounds, 62 N.J. Eq. 729, 48 A. 771 (N.J. 1901)).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 64, 156 A. at 190.
85 See id. at 58, 156 A. at 188; Robinson, 14 Del. Ch. at 199, 126 A. at 48.
86 19 Del. Ch. 326, 167 A. 831 (1933).
87 See id. at 329-30, 167 A. at 833.
88 Id. at 326, 167 A. at 832. The gravamen of the complaint was that the defendant received inadequate consideration for the assets sold. Id. After the original
complaint was filed, the sale was consummated, and the plaintiffs amended their
complaint, seeking a return to the status quo or equivalent relief. Id. at 326-27, 167
A. at 832.
78
79
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that the officers and directors of the defendant corporation failed
to examine the purchasing corporation's books, as well as their
own records."9 The plaintiffs argued that they were thereby deprived of the benefit of the directors' informed judgment in deciding to sell the assets of the corporation.9 " The plaintiffs
maintained, therefore, that the directors' decision was not in the
best interests of the corporation. 1 The court rejected this assertion and found that the directors had examined the books of the
purchasing corporation. 92 Nevertheless, the court implicitly recognized that in addition to acting in good faith, corporate directors must make an informed and intelligent decision under the
business judgment rule. 3
The requirements that directors act in good faith and in an
informed manner were the determinative factors in subsequent
decisions upholding the business judgment of 95
directors. 4 For
example, in the 1964 decision of Cheffv. Mathes, the Delaware
Supreme Court upheld the directors' decision to repurchase corporate stock primarily because there was no showing that the directors had acted with an improper motive. 96 The transaction at
issue in Cheff was the repurchase of corporate stock in response
to a hostile takeover attempt.97
Early in 1957, Arnold Maremont, well-known in corporate
liquidation activities, began purchasing stock of the Holland Furnace Company (Holland).98 In August, 1957, Maremont demanded that he be named to Holland's board of directors
because he controlled approximately 100,000 shares of Holland
stock.99 Because of Maremont's threat to alter substantially the
operating procedures of Holland, his demand was refused.10°
89 Id. at 329, 167 A. at 833.
90 Id.

91 Id. The plaintiffs argued that by failing to examine the books of either the
purchaser or the seller, the directors were uninformed as to the value of both the
purchaser's stock and the seller's stock and thus could not determine whether the
exchange was a fair one. See id.
92 Id. at 329-30, 167 A. at 833.
93 See id.
94 See, e.g., Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); Muschel
v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 1973).
95 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
96 Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556.
97 Id. at 496-97, 199 A.2d at 549-51.
98 Id. at 499, 199 A.2d at 551. Holland Furnace Company was a Delaware corporation that was publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 497, 499,
199 A.2d at 550, 551.
99 Id. at 500, 199 A.2d at 551.
100 Id. At a meeting with P.T. Cheff, chief executive officer of Holland,
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Fearing a takeover of Holland by Maremont, Holland's board of
directors authorized the corporation to purchase the company's
stock.'' Unable to effect the takeover, Maremont offered to sell
his stock back to Holland at a premium. °2 Holland accepted and
consummated the deal with company funds.10 3 The plaintiffs, minority shareholders of Holland, then instituted a shareholders'
derivative suit against Holland's board of directors. 0 4 In their
suit, the shareholders alleged that the repurchase of Holland
stock was motivated by an improper desire to ensure0 5 the continued control of Holland by its incumbent directors.1
The trial court accepted the shareholders' assertion and
found the directors liable. 10 6 On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Delaware reversed. 10 7 After a cursory review of the evidence
before it, the supreme court observed that in the absence of an
improper motive, the directors' decision to purchase the company stock "was a matter of business judgment."'0 8 The court
Maremont expressed his desire to liquidate Holland or substantially alter its sales
force. Id.
i01 Id. at 501, 199 A.2d at 552.
102 See id.
103 Id. at 502, 199 A.2d at 552-53. Maremont's company sold 155,000 shares of
stock to Holland at $14.40 per share, which was higher than the going market price.
Id.
104 Id., 199 A.2d at 553.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 503, 199 A.2d at 553. The trial court observed that the majority of the
board believed that the only option available to defeat the hostile takeover attempt
was the purchase of Maremont's stock. See id. Those directors were therefore exonerated from liability. Id. The court, however, imposed liability on the four directors
who had been aware of the existence of another potential purchaser. Id. The trial
judge reasoned that the directors' knowledge of the existence of this alternative
evidenced an improper desire to insure continued control of Holland. See id.
107 Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 557.
108 Id., 199 A.2d at 556. In reaching its conclusion that the directors were justified in purchasing Holland's stock with company funds, the court stated:
The unrebutted testimony before the court indicated: (1) Maremont had
deceived Cheff as to his original intentions, since his open market
purchases were contemporaneous with his disclaimer of interest in Holland; (2) Maremont had given Cheff some reason to believe that he intended to eliminate the retail sales force of Holland; (3) Maremont
demanded a place on the board; (4) Maremont substantially increased
his purchases after having been refused a place on the board; (5) the
directors had good reason to believe that unrest among key employees
had been engendered by the Maremont threat; (6) the board had received advice from Dun and Bradstreet indicating the past liquidation or
quick sale activities of [Maremont's company]; (7) the board had received professional advice from the firm of Merril Lynch, Fenner &
Beane, who recommended that the purchase from [Maremont's company] be carried out; (8) the board had received competent advice that
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therefore concluded that the directors should not be held personally liable. 109
In Muschel v. Western Union Corp.,"10 a 1973 decision, a Delaware chancery court engaged in analysis"' similar to that applied
forty years earlier in Mitchell. The court's decision focused on
both the good faith of the directors and their duty to make an
informed judgment." 2 In Muschel, Regrem, Inc., a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Western Union, sought to merge into National
Sharedata Corporation (National). 1 3 National was to survive the
merger as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Western Union. "4 As
part of this transaction, Western Union was to issue shares of its
common stock to the existing National shareholders at an agreeable exchange ratio.' Upon learning of this plan, the plaintiffs,
minority shareholders of Western Union, petitioned for a preliminary injunction against the proposed merger. 1 6 The plaintiffs
contended that the directors did not receive all material information relevant to the proposed merger and hence could not have
made an informed business judgment in approving the
merger."' In addition, they contended that Western Union had
' 18
agreed to pay an excessive price for National.
Initially, the court noted that the business judgment rule was
the standard to be applied to this merger decision. "' Under this
rule, the plaintiffs had the burden of establishing fraud, either
the corporation was over-capitalized; (9) . . . Cheff had made informal
personal investigations from contacts in the business and financial community and had reported to the board of the alleged poor reputation of
Maremont.
Id. at 507, 199 A.2d at 556.
109 Id. at 509, 199 A.2d at.556-57.
11o 310 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 1973).
I

See id. at 908-09.

See id. at 908.
Id. at 905.
14 Id.
115 Id. at 905-06. Western Union was to issue 880,000 shares of its common
stock in exchange for 2,278,727 of National's common stock. Id. Thus, the agreed
upon exchange ratio was 0.387 shares of Western Union for each share of National.
Id. at 906.
116 Id.
117 Id. The plaintiffs contended that the board was not informed that National
often issued stock options and warrants to potential customers as an incentive to
enter into long-term contracts. Id. at 908. Additionally, the plaintiffs maintained
that the board was not informed that a certain projection of National's revenues
was substantially inflated. Id. A different projection prepared for National's officers
presented a gloomier financial picture. See id.
112
''3

118 Id. at 906.
''9

Id. at 908.
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actual or constructive, on the part of the directors. '2o The Muschel
court stated that when an alleged fraud is based on a "discriminatory undervaluation or overvaluation of corporate assets," the
disparity in valuation must be so great as to show "a conscious
abuse of discretion" and not merely "an honest error of judgment." 121 The court further reasoned that the business judgment
rule affords corporate directors wide discretion in making decisions relating to the matter of corporate valuation. 122 In addition,
the court noted that the business judgment rule protects a
board's decision from reproach if it "can be attributed to any rational business purpose." 1 2 3 Finally, the court stated that it would
not substitute
its own business judgment for that of the
2 4
directors.'
Proceeding with its analysis in light of these considerations,
the Muschel court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the board
lacked material facts in making its decision to merge the companies. 2 5 The court stated that there was evidence in the record
indicating that the allegedly material facts were actually nonmaterial; thus, disclosure to the board was unnecessary. 126 Similarly,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' allegation that the projection of
National's revenues presented to Western Union's board reflected a better financial position than a similar projection prepared for National's officers. 2 7 The court reasoned that the
projection offered to the board represented National's potential
financial position after the proposed merger, while the other report was intended to be a projection for National prior to the
proposed merger. 2 8 The Muschel court therefore concluded that
the directors had acted in an informed manner and
were entitled
2J
to the protection of the business judgment rule.1 9
Despite the apparent deference of the Delaware courts to the
Id.
Id. (citing Cole, 18 Del. Ch. at 57, 156 A. at 187).
122 Id.
123 Id. (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
124 See id.
125 Id. at 908-09.
121 Id. In rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that the board was not advised of
National's practice of issuing stock options and warrants to prospective customers,
the court noted that only two options were exercised by National's customers. Id. al
908. The remainder of the options expired before they were exercised. Id.
127 Id. at 909.
128 Id.
129 Id. Because of its conclusion that the directors' decision was within the business judgment rule, the court found it unnecessary to question the price Western
Union had agreed to pay for National. See id.
120
121
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business judgment of directors, the Delaware chancery court in
Gimbel v. Signal Companies' 3 0 acknowledged that the business judgment rule does not "irrevocably [shield] the decisions of corporate directors from challenge."'' In Gimbel, the court enjoined a
corporation's sale of stock in its wholly-owned subsidiary because
the price offered was grossly inadequate. 3 2 The transaction challenged arose when Signal Companies, Inc. (Signal) agreed to sell
all of the outstanding capital stock of one of its wholly-owned
subsidiaries to Burmah Oil Inc. (Burmah). 3 3
In October and November of 1973, Burmah and Signal entered into preliminary negotiations concerning Burmah's possible purchase of some or all of the subsidiary's properties. 3 4 On
December 18, 1973, Burmah made a formal purchase offer to
Signal, which was conditioned upon Signal's acceptance on or
before December 21, 1973. t1 5 A special meeting of Signal's
board of directors was called on December 21 st, and after only a
few hours' consideration, the board voted to approve the transaction. 13 The plaintiff, a minority shareholder of Signal, instituted
a derivative action seeking to enjoin the sale.' 3 7 The plaintiff
claimed that the sale price was "wholly inadequate" and that the
directors had acted hastily in approving the sale.' 3 '
The Gimbel court first noted that the business judgment rule
provides a presumption that directors act in good faith and in the
best interests of the corporation. 1 9 In addition, the court stated
that directors' "decisions will not be disturbed if they can be at130

316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), affd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).

131 Id. at 609.
132

See id. at 618.

133 Id. at 601.
134 Id. at 612. In October, 1973, representatives of Burmah approached the president of Signal and indicated that Burmah was interested in acquiring the assets of
the subsidiary for approximately $400 million. Id. Discussions continued throughout November, but the possible transaction was not revealed to Signal's board of
directors until December 21, 1973. Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. The directors were given 36 hours' notice of this meeting, and the outside
directors received no notice of the meeting's purpose. Id. Three of the outside
directors were informed about the proposed sale for the first time at this meeting.
Id. The meeting "resulted in the approval of a transaction of over $480,000,000
and possibly one of the largest private cash sales ever to take place." Id.
137 Id. at 601.
138 Id. at 604. The complaint also alleged self-interest and personal motivation
on the part of certain directors. Id. The court quickly disposed of this allegation by
noting that nothing in the record justified a finding that the directors were improperly motivated. Id.
139 Id. at 608-09 (citing Robinson, 14 Del. Ch. at 199, 126 A. at 48).
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tributed to any rational business purpose."' 4 ° The court recognized, however, that the business judgment rule is not an
irrebuttable presumption. 141

Proceeding in light of these principles, the court addressed
the threshold question of whether the directors acted "with informed reasonable deliberation" by approving the sale. 142 In answering this question in the affirmative, the court considered all
43
of the evidence before it in an exhaustive and detailed manner. 1
The court analyzed several factors, including the events leading
up to the offer in December, 144 the directors' conduct at the special board meeting of December 21st, 145 the experience and ex-

pertise of the directors,' 46 and the overall situation of Signal
prior to the sale.' 4 7 The court ultimately concluded that these
factors were insufficient to raise "a reasonable probability that
the plaintiff48 will be able to pierce the 'business judgment'
standard." 1
The Gimbel court then observed that the primary issue in the
case was whether there was a gross disparity between the price
paid for Signal's subsidiary and its true value. ' 49 After a close examination of the evidence relating to the issue of value,' 50 the
court concluded that further investigation into the fair value of
5 ' The court therefore granted the
the subsidiary was warranted.'
52

preliminary injunction.
Seven years after the Gimbel decision, in the seminal case of
140 Id. at 609 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971)).
141 Id. (citing Marks v. Wolfson, 41 Del. Ch. 115, 123, 188 A.2d 680, 685 (1963)).
142 Id. at 611. The court characterized this part of the case as "those allegations
whereby the plaintiff seeks to hurdle the protections of the business judgment
rule." Id.
143 See id. at 611-15.
144 Id. at 611-12.
145 Id. at 612-13.
146 Id. at 613.
147 Id. at 613-14.
148 Id. at 615.
149 Id. Although the court concluded that the directors' actions were proper, it
noted that a "method which produces a dollar result which appears perhaps to be
shocking is significant." Id.
150 See id. at 615-17.
151 Id. at 617. After a thorough review of the evidence presented by the expert
witnesses on the issue of valuation, the court observed that the conflicting dollar
values varied so greatly that there was a substantial probability "that someone may
be dead wrong." Id. Moreover, the court acknowledged that it was unable to estimate accurately the value of the company. Id.
152 Id. at 618. It is noteworthy that in granting the preliminary injunction, the
court set the required security at $25 million. Id. The plaintiffs appealed this
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Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,' 53 the Supreme Court of Delaware further evidenced the willingness of Delaware courts to scrutinize a
board of directors' exercise of its business judgment. In fact, the
Zapata court required trial courts to apply their own business
judgment when reviewing a board's decision to dismiss a share54
holder derivative suit. 1
In Zapata, Maldonado instituted a derivative suit against ten
officers and directors of the Zapata Corporation, alleging a
breach of fiduciary duty.1 55 The plaintiff brought the action without first requesting the corporation to do so, as required by Delaware law.' 5 6 Four years after the institution of that action, two
outside directors were appointed by the existing board to replace
four of the defendant directors who were no longer on the
board. 57 These new directors were then appointed as an "Independent Investigation Committee" to determine whether the
corporation should pursue the pending shareholder suit filed by
Maldonado.' 5 8 The committee ultimately determined that the
shareholder's derivative suit was not in the best interests of the
company and should therefore be dismissed.' 59 The Zapata Corporation then sought dismissal of the action, which the chancery
court denied on the basis that the business judgment rule does
160
not authorize the dismissal of shareholder derivative suits.
The Supreme Court of Delaware then reversed and held that a
committee of independent directors may cause the corporation
to file a pretrial application in the court of chancery seeking dis16 1
missal of a shareholder's derivative suit.
In reaching its decision, the Zapata court articulated a twostep approach to determine the propriety of the committee's decision. 1 6 2 Initially, a court should examine "the independence
amount unsuccessfully on the ground that it was unreasonable. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
153 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
154
155
156

See id. at 789.
Id. at 780.

Id. Delaware Court of Chancery rule 23.1 states in part: "The complaint shall
also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for his
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
157 Zapata, 430 A.2d at 781.
158 Id.
159
1o

Id.
Id.

161 Id. at 788.
162

See id.
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and good faith of the committee."'' 63 If the committee fails this
threshold determination, the court should then deny the corporation's motion to dismiss. 164 If the committee is found to have
acted independently and in good faith, however, the court should
then proceed to the second step of the analysis.' 65 In this step,
the court should apply its own independent business judgment to
determine whether the committee's decision should be
66
upheld. 1

Although the rule articulated in Zapata was limited to corporate directors' decisions to dismiss shareholder derivative suits,
the case signaled an increasing trend toward stricter examination
of corporate directors' decisions that had previously been protected under the business judgment rule. In the Van Gorkom case,
the Delaware Supreme Court continued this trend. The court exhaustively reviewed the decision of Trans Union's board of directors to approve Jay Pritzker's merger proposal. 167 In reversing
the trial court's ruling that the approval of the merger was an
informed decision protected by the business judgment rule, 168 a
majority of the Van Gorkom court concluded that the directors of
Trans Union had breached their fiduciary duty to the sharehold163 Id. The court stated: "[T]he corporation should have the burden of proving
independence, good faith and a reasonable investigation, rather than presuming
independence, good faith and reasonableness." Id.
164 Id. at 789.
165 Id.
166 Id. The court explained the rationale for this part of its decision as follows:
This means, of course, that instances could arise where a committee can
establish its independence and sound bases for its good faith decisions
and still have the corporation's motion denied. The second step is intended to thwart instances where corporate actions meet the criteria of
step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where
corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder
grievance deserving of further consideration in the corporation's interest. The Court of Chancery of course must carefully consider and weigh
how compelling the corporate interest in dismissal is when faced with a
non-frivolous lawsuit. The Court of Chancery should, when appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition to the corporation's best interests.
Id.
167 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864-70.
168 See Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, slip op. at 15 (Del. Ch. July 6, 1982), rev'd sub
non. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The court of chancery's
judgment was based upon two findings: (1) the directors had acted in an informed
manner in deciding to approve the Pritzker merger and thus should be entitled to
the protection of the business judgment rule, and (2) the stockholders had been
"fairly informed" when they voted to approve the merger and therefore their vote
should not be set aside. Id. at 13-14.

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

260

[Vol. 16:242

ers. ' 6 9 The court's finding of liability was predicated on both the
director's failure to apprise themselves of all relevant information before recommending the proposed merger to the shareholders and their failure to disclose to the 70shareholders all
information material to the proposed merger.
Writing for the majority, Justice Horsey first noted that a director of a corporation serves both the corporation and its shareholders in a fiduciary capacity.' 7 ' As a fiduciary, a director must
be informed prior to making any directorial decisions. 7 2 The
court observed that the business judgment rule is a "presumption that in making a business decision, the directors. . .acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company."' 17 3 According to the Van Gorkom majority, however, the business judgment
rule does not preclude liability for decisions made in an uninformed or unadvised manner. 74 Qualifying this potential for liability, the court reasoned that "gross negligence is. . .the proper
standard for determining whether a business judgment reached
by a board of directors was an informed one."' 7 5
Based upon these standards, the court meticulously analyzed
the conduct of Trans Union's directors that led to their approval
of the Pritzker merger agreement. 176 The Van Gorkom court stated
that it would initially determine whether the directors acted in an
informed manner at the September 20, 1980 board meeting. 177 A
finding that the directors' conduct failed this threshold inquiry
would then cause the court to ascertain whether the directors'
subsequent actions were sufficient to rectify their prior negligent
78
conduct.
Examining the directors' conduct at the first board meeting,
Justice Horsey noted that the directors were wholly unaware of
the intrinsic value of Trans Union.179 The court observed that the
trial court's decision that the directors were informed was based
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
Id.
171 Id. at 872 (citing Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 167, 2 A.2d 225, 238
(1938), aff'd, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)).
172 Id. (citing Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 595-96, 171 A.2d 381, 388 (1961)).
173 Id. (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
174 Id. (citing Mitchell, 19 Del. Ch. at 330, 167 A. at 833).
175 Id. at 873 (footnote omitted).
176 See id. at 873-88.
177 Id. at 874.
169
170

178

Id.

179! Id.

at 874, 878.
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in part on the fact that Pritzker had offered to pay a substantial
premium over the prevailing market price of Trans Union
shares.' 8 The majority conceded that a significant premium may
provide sufficient ground to recommend a merger when assessed
in light of information that truly reflects the value of the business
being sold. 1 8 ' Applying this rationale, the Van Gorkom court determined that the market value of Trans Union's stock could not
be used as a factor in evaluating the proposed merger because it
did not 2 represent an accurate appraisal of the corporation's
worth.18

The supreme court focused on the fact that the directors had
relied entirely upon Van Gorkom's representation that $55 per
share was a fair selling price. 83 Justice Horsey observed that the
Trans Union board had made no attempt to prepare a valuation
study, despite the relative simplicity with which such a study
could have been undertaken. 8 4 Furthermore, the court opined
that had the directors questioned either Van Gorkom or Romans
concerning the proposed price, they would have discovered that
$55 was merely a subjective8 5figure designed to evaluate the merits of a leveraged buy out.

In response to the directors' contention that they had relied
upon the legal advice of outside counsel in approving the
merger, 8 6 the Van Gorkom majority stated that this defense was
inadequate in this factual context.' 87 The court reiterated that
Id. at 875.
Id.
182 Id. at 875-76. Justice Horsey noted that the market price of Trans Union's
stock was "historically depressed" because Trans Union was unable to use its Investment Tax Credits (ITCs). Id. In addition, the court observed that there was a
conflict between the directors' approval of the transaction and their statements in
the proxies sent out to shareholders. Id. at 876. The directors relied on the market
price of Trans Union stock in approving the merger, while the proxies indicated
that the company's "inherent value" was greater than the public trading price. Id.
Finally, the court pointed out that market price merely represents the value of a
single share of stock. Id.
183 See id. at 877. The court noted that prior to the September 20th meeting, the
board had never assessed Trans Union's true value. See id.
184 Id. at 876-77. Although it recognized that a valuation study or a fairness opinion by independent investment bankers was not required by law, the court reasoned that such a study would have uncovered Trans Union's large cash flow, thus
giving the directors a better idea of the company's true worth. Id. at 876.
185 Id. at 877.
186 Id. at 880. Several of the directors testified at trial that James Brennan,
outside counsel to Trans Union, had informed them that Delaware law required
neither a fairness opinion nor an independent valuation study. Id. at 881.
187 See id.
180
181
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the ultimate consideration was whether the directors possessed
adequate information regarding the inherent worth of the company to make an informed business judgment.' 8 Having concluded that the Trans Union directors had not been so informed,
the court rejected the directors' defense that legal counsel had
swayed their decision. 18 9 Although the directors claimed that
counsel had warned them of potential lawsuits if they refused
Pritzker's merger offer, Justice Horsey reasoned that "mere acknowledgment of this circumstance cannot be rationally translated into a justification for a board permitting itself to be
stampeded into a patently unadvised act."' 90
The Van Gorkom majority similarly rejected the directors'
contention that their merger decision could be validated on the
basis of their "collective experience and sophistication."'' Justice Horsey reasoned that a board's experience and expertise
may be outweighed by proof of gross negligence. 9 2 Moreover,
he observed that such experience is irrelevant if the members of
the board are not given an opportunity to make an informed decision. 19 3 After a review of the evidence before it, the Van Gorkom
majority determined that the directors were grossly negligent in
approving the merger after only two hours' consideration. 194 The
court therefore concluded that the directors had not acted in an
informed manner at the September 20th board meeting, thus
failing this threshold inquiry.' 9 5
I8 Id. The court reasoned that the mere fact that a fairness opinion is not required by law was insufficient to exonerate a director who failed to become informed about the true value of a corporation. See id.
189 Id.
190

Id.

19I Id. at 880. The business acumen of the Trans Union directors was a primary
factor in the trial court's determination that the directors had acted in an informed
manner. See Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, slip op. at 13 (Del. Ch.July 6, 1982), rev'd
siub nor. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also supra note 23
(detailed enumeration of the directors' qualifications and experience).
192 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 880.
I93 Id. The majority analogized the Van Gorkom case to Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316
A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), affd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974). Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 880.
In Gimbel, the trial court enjoined a corporate board's sale of stock of its whollyowned subsidiary for an alleged grossly inadequate price. See Gimbel, 316 A.2d at
618. The Van Gorkonm majority reasoned that the Gimbel court's decision was "based
on a finding that the business judgment rule had been pierced for failure of management to give its board 'the opportunity to make a reasonable and reasoned decision.' " I'an Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 880 (quoting Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 615); see supra
notes 130-152 and accompanying text (discussion of Gimbel).
194 See Vlan Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 881.
195

Id.
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Proceeding to the second prong of its analysis, the court endeavored to determine whether the directors' actions after September 20th were sufficient to rectify their prior negligent
conduct. 19 6 The court first evaluated the directors' conduct from
October 8th to October 10th-the period in which amendments
to the merger agreement were approved by the board. 97 In concluding that the directors had acted in an uninformed manner
during this period, the court relied primarily upon three factors.
Initially, the court focused upon the directors' conduct at the October 8th board meeting concerning the approval of the amendments to the merger agreement. 9 8 Justice Horsey observed that
following Van Gorkom's cursory explanation of the content of
the proffered amendments, the directors had approved the
amendments sight unseen, thereby permitting the agreement "to
be amended in a manner [they] had neither authorized nor intended."' 99 The court opined that in order for the business judgment rule to absolve the directors from liability, they must
demonstrate that they "knew what they were doing,
and ensured
20 0
that their purported action was given effect."
The second factor that Justice Horsey considered was the effect of the October 10th amendments. 2 0 ' Although the amend-

ments purported to give Trans Union the right to solicit other
offers openly until January 31, 1981, the court concluded that
their actual effect was much more limited. 0 2 The court observed
that the October 10th amendments permitted Trans Union to
terminate the deal with Pritzker only if it had actually consummated another merger or if it "had entered into a 'definitive'
merger agreement more favorable than Pritzker's and for a
greater consideration-subject only to stockholder approval.' '203
Furthermore, the court noted that the October 10th amendments
had in fact reduced the period in which Trans Union could solicit
bids.2 0 4 The reason for this was that the October 10th amend196 Id.
197 See id. at 881-84.
198 See id. at 882-83.

199 Id. at 884. The actual amendments had not been drafted at the time of the
October 8th meeting. Id. at 883. Nonetheless, the board approved the amendments and gave Van Gorkom the authority to execute the documents upon receipt
of them. Id.
200 Id. at 883 n.25.
201 See id. at 883.
202
203
204

Id.
Id.
Id.
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ments required Trans Union to submit its preliminary proxy
statements by December 5, 1980 and to mail the statements to
the shareholders by January 5, 1981.205
The Van Gorkom majority then evaluated the effect of the
September 22nd and October 9th press releases on the original
negligent conduct of the directors. 20 6 The September 22nd release announced that Trans Union "had entered into definitive
agreements to merge with an affiliate of The Marmon Group,
Inc."'2 1' The October 9th release announced that Pritzker had
obtained all the necessary financing for the merger and that he
intended to exercise his option to purchase 1,000,000 shares of
Trans Union stock at just above the market price. 20 8 The court
opined that the effect of these press releases was to deter others
interested in merging with Trans Union and to lock Trans
Union's board into the Pritzker agreement. 20 9 Based on these observations, the court concluded that the directors' conduct was2 as
,0
negligent on October 8th as it had been on September 20th.
The Van Gorkom court also considered the curative effect of
the market test upon which the directors relied to confirm their
decision to approve the proposed Pritzker merger. 2 1 ' The directors maintained that the existence of the market test period established that they did not act impulsively in reaching their
merger decision on September 20th.2 1 2 The directors further
contended that the adequacy of Pritzker's offering price was
"conclusively established" by the fact that no other offers were
received during the market test period.21 3 Rejecting both of these
arguments, the court noted that there was no evidence indicating
that the merger agreement gave the board the unfettered right to
put Trans Union up for sale to the highest bidder, nor was there
evidence that a public auction of Trans Union had actually
205 Id. The October 10th amendments did, however, postpone the shareholder
meeting at which the merger proposal was to be submitted for shareholder approval from January 10, 1981 to February 10, 1981. Id. at 886 n.29.
206 See id. at 881-84.
207 Id. at 881-82. The press release made no mention of Trans Union's right to
perform a "market test" or the right to withdraw from the Pritzker merger if it
received a better offer. Id. at 882. In addition, Trans Union failed to make a subsequent announcement that it reserved the right to solicit other offers. Id.
208 Id. at 883.
209 See id. at 884.
210 Id. at 883-84.
211 Id. at 878.
212 Id.
213 Id.
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occurred.2 14
The court further found it necessary to examine both Van
Gorkom's and Pritzker's reactions to the KKR and GE merger
proposals.21 5 Justice Horsey noted that when Van Gorkom was
confronted with KKR's proposal to purchase Trans Union, he reacted in a completely negative manner and refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the offer.21 6 The court noted that KKR
consequently withdrew its offer shortly before the Trans Union
board meeting that day.21 7 In addition, the court observed that
GE, Trans Union's only other potential suitor, was deterred from
making a firm offer as a result of Pritzker's refusal to extend the
February 10th deadline for the stockholders' meeting. 218
Finally, the Van Gorkom majority examined the corrective effects of theJanuary 26, 1981 board meeting. 21 9 Initially, the court
reasoned that, even though all information relevant to the
Pritzker merger had then been disclosed to the directors,2 20 their
214 Id. In reaching both of these conclusions, the court relied on the following
facts, which appeared in the lower court's record: (1) the directors failed to produce
the original merger agreement at trial; (2) Van Gorkom testified that the agreement
he signed on September 20th prohibited Trans Union from soliciting competing
offers and from furnishing additional information to interested parties; (3) the
agreement lacked a clause that specifically provided for the right to accept a better
offer; and (4) the September 22nd press release failed to mention Trans Union's
purported right to solicit other offers or accept higher bids. See id. at 878-79.
215 See id. at 884-85. For a detailed account of the KKR and GE proposals, see
supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
216 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 884-85. Van Gorkom did not view the offer as firm
because it was contingent upon obtaining financing of $650 million. Id. Henry R.
Kravis, a representative of KKR, stated that the financing arrangements were 80%
complete. Id. at 884.
217 Id. at 885. KKR stated that the reason for its retraction was "a sudden decision of the Chief Officer of Trans Union's rail car leasing operation to withdraw
from the KKR purchasing group." Id. The court posited that the chief officer's
decision to withdraw may have been the result of a conversation he had with Van
Gorkom prior to the board meeting. Id. Van Gorkom, however, denied any such
responsibility. Id.
218 Id. Although GE made a written proposal in mid-January, it was not in the
form of an actual offer. Id. If Pritzker would extend the February 10th deadline of
the stockholders' meeting, GE was willing to make a formal offer of between $2 and
$5 per share above Pritzker's offer. Id. When Pritzker refused to grant such an
extension, GE terminated its proposal. Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 886. The following facts were disclosed at the January 26th board meeting: (1) prior to September 20th, no board members or members of senior management, except Chelberg and Peterson, were aware that Van Gorkom had
discussed the transaction with Pritzker; (2) Van Gorkom had initially suggested the
$55 price to Pritzker; (3) the board had declined to seek an independent fairness
opinion; (4) Romans and several other members of senior management had expressed concern at the September 20th meeting that $55 was an inadequate price;
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decision to approve the merger once again failed to evidence a
reasoned and informed judgment because the directors were
mistaken as to their available courses of action.2 2' In support of
this conclusion, the court relied primarily upon a Delaware statute, 22 2 which, in the opinion of the court, provided the directors
with only two legally viable alternatives.223 According to the Van
Gorkom majority, the directors' available courses of action were
either to continue to recommend the merger to the stockholders
or to rescind the agreement with Pritzker and notify the stockholders that the February 10th meeting was cancelled.224 Justice
Horsey reasoned that the second alternative was not practically
available to the directors because it involved the risk that Pritzker
might sue for breach of the agreement.22 5 The court therefore
concluded that the January 26th board meeting had no real curative effects.226
The Van Gorkom court next addressed the directors' contention that their negligence had been excused by the shareholders'
(5) the financial department of Trans Union had prepared a study indicating that
Trans Union had a value of approximately $55 to $65 per share; and (6) Romans
was unable to advise the board that $55 was an unfair price. Id.
221 Id. at 888. The directors contended that at this meeting they had three available alternatives: "(1) to 'continue to recommend' the Pritzker merger; (2) to 'recommend that the stockholders vote against' the Pritzker merger; or (3) to take a
noncommittal position on the merger and 'simply leave the decision to [the] shareholders.' " Id. at 887-88.
222 Id. at 888. The court relied on title 8, § 251 of the Delaware Code, which
provides in part:
The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge
or consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of
merger or consolidation. The agreement shall state: (1) the terms and
conditions of the merger or consolidation; (2) the mode of carrying the
same into effect; (3) the amendments or changes in the certificate of
incorporation of the surviving corporation as are desired to be effected
by the merger or consolidation, or, if no such amendments or changes
are desired, a statement that the certificate of incorporation of [one] of
the constituent corporations shall be the certificate of incorporation of
the surviving or resulting corporation; (4) the manner of converting the
shares of each of the constituent corporations . . . and (5) such other
details or provisions as are deemed desirable. . . . The agreement so
adopted shall be executed in accordance with § 103 of this title.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1975).
223 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888.
224 Id.
225 Id. Pritzker's potential suit would be for breach of the September 20th agreement as amended on October 10th. Id. Under the October 10th amendment, the
board's only legally available way out of the agreement was a more favorable agreement to sell Trans Union to a third party. Id.
226 Id.
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vote to approve the merger.2 2 7 Initially, the court recognized that
a board's decision may be sustained, regardless of the defects
present in the board's action, if it is approved by a majority vote
of fully informed shareholders. 2 28 Noting that Delaware law required disclosure of all material facts in proxy statements,2 2 9 the
majority concluded that the proxies sent to Trans Union's shareholders did not fully inform them of all facts relevant to the
Pritzker merger.2 30 Hence, the stockholder vote of February 10th
did not serve to excuse the directors' uninformed approval of the
merger.2 3 '
In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice McNeilly likened the
majority's opinion to "an advocate's closing address to a hostile
jury. ' 2 3 2 Justice McNeilly stated that the combined education,
experience, and general business acumen of the directors 23 3 constituted important evidence of their ability to make "on the
spot," informed business decisions regarding the affairs of Trans
Union. 23 4' Taking a broad view of the protection the business
judgment rule affords corporate directors, Justice McNeilly believed that the rule shielded the decision of Trans Union's directors to recommend the merger to Trans Union's shareholders.23 5
As additional support for his conclusion, Justice McNeilly
briefly examined the directors' conduct fromJuly, 1980 until the
shareholder meeting in February, 1981.236 He noted that the directors received a new five-year forecast for Trans Union at the
227

228

See id. at 889.
Id.

Id. at 890.
Id. The court noted the following deficiencies in the proxy statements sent
out by the directors: (1) the directors failed to disclose the fact that they had no
reasonable basis for determining the true worth of Trans Union other than the
depressed market value; (2) the board's characterization of Romans's report in the
supplemental proxy statements sent out; (3) the board's reference to the substantial
premium offered was misleading to the shareholders; (4) the board's failure to disclose that Van Gorkom suggested the $55 per share price; (5) the fact that most of
the directors were unaware of the potential merger prior to the September 20th
board meeting; (6) the fact that the directors had failed to seek an independent
fairness study; (7) the fact that several members of management were concerned
that $55 was an unfair price; and (8) the fact that Trans Union's chief financial
officer had informed the board that he had prepared a study indicating that the
company had a value of approximately $55 to $65 per share. Id. at 890-92.
229
230

231
232

Id. at 893.

235

See id.

236

Id. at 895-97 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).

Id. (McNeilly, J., dissenting). Justice McNeilly accused the majority of portraying the Pritzker merger as a "fast shuffle." Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
233 Id.; see supra note 23 (summary of the directors' credentials).
234 Id. at 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
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July board meeting. 23 7 In addition, Justice McNeilly pointed out
that at the August board meeting, Van Gorkom presented the
directors with a comprehensive study of Trans Union prepared
by an outside consulting group.238 Moreover, the dissent found
Van Gorkom's explanation of the terms of the Pritzker agreement at the September 20th meeting totally acceptable.23 9 Thus,
Justice McNeilly reasoned that the directors were well-informed
when they made their decision to recommend the Pritzker
merger at the September 20th meeting. 240 Furthermore, the dissent stated that the October 10th amendments established the
right of Trans Union to solicit higher bids and permitted unilateral termination of the Pritzker merger agreement by entry into a
definitive merger agreement that was more favorable to the
stockholders.241 Justice McNeilly pointed to the results of the
market test as an indication of the fairness of the Pritzker agreement.2 4 2 Finally, the dissent noted that both the supplement to
237 Id. at 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). The five-year forecast was prepared by
Trans Union's management and projected an annual income growth of about 20%.
Id.
238 Id. The comprehensive study of Trans Union was prepared by the Boston
Consulting Group. Id. This study was compiled during an 18 month period and
contained a detailed analysis of all aspects of Trans Union, including its subsidiaries. Id.
239 See id. This was clear from the fact that at the September 20th meeting the
directors required the merger proposal to be modified to reflect the fact that the
directors could accept a better offer and to require that any potential suitor be
given the same information as had been provided Pritzker. Id. For support, the
dissent pointed to the language in the agreement stating "that GL and NTC acknowledge that the Board of Directorsof TU may have a competingfiduciary obligation to the Stockholders under certain circumstances." Id. It is noteworthy that the majority pointed to
this same language as being clearly insufficient to prove that the directors did in
fact amend the merger agreement to include these two provisions. See id. at 879; see
also supra note 214 and accompanying text (noting that the amended agreement
lacked a specific description of the right to accept a better offer).
240 Id. at 897 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 895-96 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). Justice McNeilly noted that the investment firm of Salomon Brothers was hired for the purpose of soliciting other offers
and did in fact put a great deal of effort into this process. Id. at 896 (McNeilly, J.,
dissenting).
242 Id. Although four companies showed some interest in Trans Union, the Justice noted that only KKR actually made an offer to purchase Trans Union. Id. at
896 n. 1 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice McNeilly argued that the real
reason KKR withdrew its offer was because of problems arising during negotiations
with the Reichmans, a Canadian family that was interested in purchasing Trans
Union. Id. Justice McNeilly also noted that Jack Kruzenga, the member of senior
management who would have become chief operating officer of the surviving company, was displeased with the proposed leveraged buy out scheme. Id. He maintained that this, not the fact that Van Gorkom spoke with him, caused Kruzenga to
withdraw from the KKR purchasing group. Id.
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the original proxy statement and their conduct at the final board
meeting evidenced an informed and reasoned decision on the directors' part.2 43 In conclusion, justice McNeilly stated that he
agreed with the majority's analysis of the business judgment rule;
however, he objected to2 44their application of the rule to the facts
of the Van Gorkom case.
While the Van Gorkom majority did not expressly articulate a
new standard for director liability under the business judgment
rule,245 the court's decision represents a pronounced departure
from the traditional approach of Delaware courts whenever the
business judgment rule has been raised as a defense.246 In fact,
the Van Gorkom decision contrasts sharply with the historically
pro-management position of the Delaware courts. Moreover, the
Van Gorkom court has given a new meaning to what constitutes an
informed decision under the business judgment rule. By holding
the directors of Trans Union personally liable to the corporation's shareholders, the Supreme Court of Delaware has taken
another step into the corporate board room and has signaled a
move towards more effective judicial scrutiny of corporate directors' conduct. Unfortunately, the Van Gorkom decision may have
the practical effect of turning the director's chair into a "hot
seat, "247 which, in turn, could have a crippling effect on the already difficult task of finding competent individuals to serve on
corporate boards.248
Under the business judgment rule, Delaware courts have
generally taken a laissez faire attitude toward the fiduciary role
and responsibility of management to its shareholders.2

49

The

business judgment rule is essentially a salutary principle; it allows
See id. at 896-97 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
Id. at 897 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent, Justice Christie
summarily voted to affirm the judgment of the court of chancery. Id. at 898 (Christie, J., dissenting).
245 The court reaffirmed the view that director liability under the business judgment rule is based upon the concept of gross negligence. Id. at 873; see supra note
175 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
247 See No More Easy Streetfor Company Directors, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 4,
1985, at 95; see also Leisner, BoardroomJitters: A Landmark Court Decision Upsets Corporate Directors, BARRON'S, Apr. 22, 1985, at 34; A Landmark Ruling That Puts Board
Members in Peril, Bus. WK., Mar. 18, 1985, at 56 [hereinafter cited as Landmark
Ruling].
248 See Inside Look at Life in the CorporateBoard Room, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,Jan.
28, 1985, at 71 [hereinafter cited as Inside the Corporate Board Room].
249 Marcus & Walters, Assault on ManagerialAutonomy, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1978, at 57, 58.
243

244

270

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:242

for creative thinking and minimizes unwarranted shareholder
suits. 2 50 Although the rule has traditionally been applied to give

directors almost unbridled discretion in making corporate decisions, this application of the rule conflicts with the basic principles upon which the rule is grounded. The basic premise of the
business judgment rule is that the directors of a corporation
stand in a fiduciary relationship with the corporation and its
shareholders; this relationship therefore creates the presumption
that directors act in good faith and in the best interests of the
corporation when making their business decisions. 25 1 As fiducia-

ries, corporate directors should be held to a higher standard of
care 25 2 in reaching their professional decisions.
Nevertheless, the business judgment rule has been commonly applied to provide corporate directors with substantial immunity from liability. 253 One oft-quoted statement of the rule has
been that a board of directors' decision "will not be disturbed if
[it] can be attributed to any rational business purpose. ' 2 54 Such a
characterization of the rule permits extremely broad discretion
on the part of directors and effectively lowers, rather than heightens, the standard of care required of directors. Thus, traditional
application of the rule accords directors far more protection than
is necessary or warranted. 55
The court's analysis of the directors' conduct in Van Gorkom
signals a movement toward closer judicial scrutiny of corporate
directors' actions. If followed by other courts, the Van Gorkon
court's approach should enhance the relationship between corporate directors, the corporation, and its shareholders by requiring directors to act with greater care in arriving at their
250 See Arsht, supra note 60, at 95.
251 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
252 See generally G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS

343-46 (5th ed. 1973) (describing general standard of care for fiduciaries).
253 See generally R. NADER, M. GREEN

&J.

SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORA-

TION 102-05 (1976); Cary, A Proposed FederalCorporateMinimum StandardsAct, 29 Bus.
LAw. 1101, 1107-08 (1974). But see Arsht, supra note 60, at 93, 96 (critics believe

"business judgment rule promises more in the way of immunity from liability than
in reality it does").
254 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Gimbel v. Signal
Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); Muschel v.
Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 1973).

255 In his article on the business judgment rule, Arsht argues that the primary
function of the business judgment rule is to accord directors the same necessary
protection that professionals such as doctors or lawyers enjoy under tort law if sued
for malpractice. Arsht, supra note 60, at 97. If this proposition is correct, then the
business judgment rule clearly requires a standard of care more demanding than
gross negligence.
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professional decisions. Continued application of Van Gorkom's
heightened level of review may effectuate a desirable balance between the protections afforded to directors under the business
judgment rule and the higher standard of care imposed upon directors as fiduciaries.
The result reached by the Van Gorkom court is not without its
shortcomings. Although gross negligence has long been recognized as the applicable standard for liability under the business
judgment rule, 256 Delaware courts historically have challenged
the business decisions of directors only upon a showing of fraud,
bad faith, or self-dealing.257 In Van Gorkom, there were no allegations of malfeasance or fraudulent motives on the part of the directors.258 There was, however, a gross disparity between the
price actually paid for Trans Union and the perceived fair value
of Trans Union at the time of the sale. This disparity was undoubtedly a factor militating in favor of the court's determination
that the directors were grossly negligent and therefore personally
liable to the plaintiffs.2 59 Hence, the Van Gorkom court was compelled to apply a somewhat tortured analysis in order to justify a
finding of gross negligence. Indicative of this is the fact that both
the court of chancery and the Van Gorkom dissent addressed the
same evidence as the supreme court majority and reached the
opposite conclusion. 6 °
While the Van Gorkom court professed an application of the
gross negligence standard to the directors' actions, a close read256 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Other courts have used
various phrases to describe the standard by which the exercise of business judgment is governed. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del.
1971) ("fraud or gross overreaching"); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d
883, 887 (Del. 1970) ("gross and palpable overreaching"); Allaun v. Consolidated
Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 325, 147 A. 257, 261 (1929) ("reckless indifference to or
deliberate disregard of the. . .stockholders"). In any event, all of these cases indicate that the standard is more demanding than simple negligence. See supra notes
175 & 245 and accompanying text.
257 See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 (Del.
1952); Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 531, 47 A.2d 479 (Del. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Del.
1939); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 193, 126 A. 46 (1924).
258 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
259 Cf. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 609-10 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d
619 (Del. 1974) (court analyzed similar evidence, but concluded that the directors
made an informed decision in approving the sale of stock of a corporation's whollyowned subsidiary).
260 Compare Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 879 with id. at 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting)
and Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, slip op. at 8 (Del. Ch. 1982), rev 'd sub nom. Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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ing of the opinion indicates that the court applied the much
stricter standard of simple negligence. 26 ' By applying this heightened level of review to the evidence before it, the Van Gorkom
court has clearly established that corporate directors must truly
make an informed business judgment to be entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule. Mere good faith on the
part of directors will no longer suffice to trigger the rule's protections. Indicative of this attitude is the court's statement that "a
director's duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in
the nature of a duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of
26 2
loyalty.

A problem arises, however, in distinguishing an informed
business judgment from an intelligent one. The Van Gorkom decision may have the adverse effect of encouraging trial judges to
apply their own notions of intelligent decison making, rather
than determining what is or is not sound business judgment.
Furthermore, by implicitly recognizing a new standard of review
under the business judgment rule-ordinary negligence-yet
failing to expressly articulate it, the Van Gorkom decision creates
substantial uncertainty as to what is expected under the rule.
Such uncertainty may very well have a chilling effect on the "free
exercise of. . .managerial power," which is a fundamental objective of the business judgment rule. 63
Similarly perplexing is the Van Gorkom court's perception of
the level of disclosure required to render shareholder ratification
of a merger valid. While the court acknowleged that informed
stockholder ratification of a board's decision will protect that decision from attack,2 64 the court's meticulous examination of the
proxy statements issued by Trans Union's board of directors evidences that the requisite standard of disclosure is extremely high.
In practice, however, proxy statements are general sources of information. 265 If corporate boards are required to disclose everything that might be considered material or germane, the proxy
statements will become voluminous. The requirement of such a
lengthy proxy statement may not only fail to accomplish the desired effect of generating an informed electorate, but may also
have the adverse consequence of creating an ignorant body of
shareholders.
See Kane & Culp, Boardroom Blues, BRIEF, Summer 1985, at 24, 26.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
263 Id. at 872; see Zapata, 430 A.2d at 782.
264 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 889.
265 See Kane & Culp, supra note 261, at 26.
261
262
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Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Van Gorkom is the potential liability that the directors of Trans Union face as a result
of this decision. On remand, the court of chancery was instructed to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the issue
of damages.266 The Van Gorkom court advised the lower court to
calculate damages by multiplying the difference between the $55
price actually paid and the fair value of the stock by the number
of shares represented by the plaintiffs' class.2 6 7 Allegedly, the fair
value of Trans Union 268
exceeded the price actually paid by approximately $200 million.

The limit of the directors' liability insur-

ance, however, was merely $10 million.269 Consequently, the
2 70
directors' potential personal liability is devastating.
Moreover, the result reached by the Van Gorkom court takes
on heightened significance when considered in light of the recent
surge in the cost of director liability insurance.27 ' Many insurance
companies are either dropping director liability insurance entirely or are drastically reducing the amount of coverage available
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
See id.
See Kane & Culp, supra note 261, at 25; Landmark Ruling, supra note 247, at 57.
Telephone interview with William Prickett, attorney for plaintiffs Alden Smith
and John W. Gosselin (Nov. 15, 1985).
270 On October 7, 1985, the parties agreed to settle the case for $23.5 million.
Smith v. Van Gorkom, No. 6342 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1985) (available Oct. 15, 1985, on
LEXIS, States library, Del. file). Pursuant to the settlement, a fund was established
for the benefit of a class of more than 10,000 former stockholders of Trans Union.
Id. The settlement was approved by the Delaware Court of Chancery on October 9,
1985. Id. In addition, the court approved an application for attorneys' fees in the
amount of $5.5 million to be paid from the settlement fund. Id. This award included fees for plaintiffs' counsel in a related Federal action. Id.
271 See Newport, ProtectingDirectors Suddenly Gets Costly, FORTUNE, Mar. 18, 1985, at
61. The following graph illustrates the recent surge in the cost of director liability
insurance:
266
267
268
269
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to a single corporation.2 7 2 The Van Gorkom decision will only aggravate this already volatile market. The difficulty in obtaining
insurance at reasonable rates coupled with the potential personal
liability of directors as a result of the Van Gorkom decision will
undoubtedly have a negative effect on any corporation seeking to
attract qualified individuals to serve on its board of directors.2 7 3
Nevertheless, the impact of the Van Gorkom decision may be
limited, primarily because the court placed excessive emphasis
on the directors' failure to determine the intrinsic value of Trans
Union before approving the merger. 274 While the court recognized that an outside valuation study is not required under Delaware law,27 5 the opinion suggests that procurement of an
independent valuation of the company would have exonerated
the directors under the business judgment rule.2 76 If directors
are permitted to avoid liability simply by contacting an investment banker or financial analyst prior to approving a transaction,
as many commentators suggest will be the case,2 7 7 the Van Gorkom
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See Inside the CorporateBoardroom, supra note 248, at 71; Kane & Culp, supra note
261, at 28.
274 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
275 Id. at 876, 881.
276 See id. at 875-78.
277 See Landmark Ruling, supra note 247, at 57; Leisner, supra note 247, at 37.
273
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decision will do nothing in the way of increasing corporate accountability. This is especially true when considered in light of
the ease with which a valuation may be obtained.
The Van Gorkom decision may prove to be nothing more than
a factual aberration in which the Supreme Court of Delaware believed that the directors had taken liberties that the business
judgment rule does not afford.278 Only time and future decisions
will determine whether the lower courts in Delaware, as well as in
other jurisdictions, are willing to adopt the activist posture so
clearly displayed by the Van Gorkom court.
James V Hetzel
278

Compare Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867-69 with Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 612-13.

